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MDY INDUSTRIES V. BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT: PREVENTING
THE USE OF SOFTWARE ROBOTS IN AN ONLINE GAME WITH
COPYRIGHT LAW
Satish Chintapalli1
In MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, the United States
District Court ofArizona had an opportunity to clariy the concept
of ownership in software copyright law. The MDY court held that
users of Blizzard's computer video game do not own the physical
copies of the game software and thus can only load the game
software into their computer's memory, subject to Blizzard's
license. Several players of Blizzard's computer video game used
software manufactured by MDY Industries in conjunction with the
game-a use prohibited by Blizzard's license. The MDY court
held that, by violating Blizzard's license, these users committed
copyright infringement. MDY Industries was also found liable for
contributory copyright infringement. Although the MDY court
stated that they were applying Ninth Circuit precedent, the court
actually applied a significantly more expansive test for
determining ownership.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent decision of the United States District Court of
Arizona, in MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment,2 examines
whether players of Blizzard Entertainment's ("Blizzard") video
game, World of Warcraft ("WoW"), which use MDY Industries'
("MDY") software robot in conjunction with WoW, are liable to
Blizzard for copyright infringement if WoW's license prohibits the
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2010.
2 No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *1 (D. Ariz.
July 14, 2008), and motion for permanent injunction and alternative motion to
amend the judgment denied, No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 78432, at * 1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2008), available at http://docs.justia.com
/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2006cv02555/322017/82/0.pdf.
1
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use of such software robots.3 This issue turns on whether the
purchasers of Blizzard's software are owners of their software
copies under 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) or licensees, as the statute
exempts purchasers from liability for copyright infringement-but
only if they own the copy of the software they are using.' Because
software transactions typically involve licenses,' determining
whether the software license conveys ownership of the software
copy is an inquiry that bridges both copyright and contract law.'
The Ninth Circuit has examined this issue before, and the MDY
court purportedly based its finding that purchasers of software
subject to "a license . . . [with] significant restrictions on . . . use"'
are not owners under 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) upon the test stated in
3 Id. at *2-6.
4 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106,
it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program ... .)
(emphasis added); MDY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988 at *25 ("At least three
cases . . . hold that licensees of a computer program do not 'own' their copy of
the program and therefore are not entitled to a section 117 defense.").
Christopher B. Yeh, Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriffs
Department: License Versus Sale At the Crossroads of Contract and Copyright,
22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 355, 357 (2007) ("In the software industry, almost all
software is licensed rather than sold (i.e. transferred with full ownership).").
6 See id. at 360 (discussing the relationship between copyright and contract
law in the software licensing context and referring to it as the "Intersection of
Copyright and Contract [Law]").
See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d
769, 785 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Generally, if the copyright owner makes it clear that
she or he is granting only a license to the copy of software and imposes
significant restrictions on the purchaser's ability to redistribute or transfer that
copy, the purchaser is considered a licensee, not an owner, of the software.");
Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995)
(implying that only an "owner" could invoke 17 U.S.C. § 117); MAI Sys. Corp.
v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Since MAI
licensed its software, the Peak customers do not qualify as 'owners' of the
software and are not eligible for protection under § 117."); S.O.S., Inc. v.
Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088-89 n.9 (9th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing the
rights granted by the Copyright Act to "owners" of software as opposed to
"mere possessors."). Cf Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171-
72 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (analyzing 17 U.S.C. § 117 in the context of the first sale
doctrine).
8 MDY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *25.
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Wall Data, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department.' This
Recent Development will argue that MDY's application of the Wall
Data test was overly broad and departs from Ninth Circuit
precedent.
Part II of this Recent Development outlines the relevant
statutory and case law. Part III summarizes the pertinent facts of
MDY. Part IV shows how these facts, coupled with Ninth Circuit
precedent, support the conclusion that the MDY court improperly
expanded the Wall Data test. Finally, Part V concludes that
MDYs holding is too broad and should not be followed when
applying the Wall Data test.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Difference Between Copies of a Work and the Copyright
The Copyright Act distinguishes between a "copy""o
embodying a creative work and the work itself." For example, the
purchaser of a copyrighted book has a copy of the copyrighted
work, not a copyright in the underlying creative work.12 Similarly,
9 Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 785 (stating a test to determine whether a software
user is a licensee). "Under the two-part test for ownership in Wall Data, the
transactions between Blizzard and persons who acquire copies of its game client
software are licenses, not sales." MDY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *26.
10 ' Copies' are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Copies need not
be physical objects; an electronic copy can be "reproduced" with the assistance
of a mechanical device. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp.
999, 1007-08 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that although a video game
manufacturer's ROM device could not physically store the images at issue, a
copy existed because the game's microprocessor generated the images and
displayed them on the game's screen by using the data stored on the ROM),
aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
1117 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) ("Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the
exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material
object in which the work is embodied.").
12Id
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in the software context, each physical object containing the
software is a "copy."l 3
B. Loading Software into RAM Creates a Copy Under 17 U.S. C
§ 101
Computers function by loading software from "long term
memory ( . . . disk) into . . . short-term memory" ("RAM"). 14
Under copyright law, the software that exists in RAM is a copy."
The "copyright owner" has the exclusive right to make or authorize
copies," including those in RAM." These temporary copies are
byproducts of the user's interaction with the computer." Although
the user may not even be aware of these temporary copies, they are
unavoidable. 19 Because software in RAM is a copy under
copyright law, the user must have statutory authorization or obtain
13 Copies are the "material object[s]" containing the copyrighted work. Id.
14 MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 93 (3rd ed. 2006)
("The use of any modem computer program necessarily involves the creation of
transitory copies in the RAM memory of a computer, and because running a
computer program necessarily involves copying the program from long term
memory (ROM, CD-ROM, or disk) into the short-term memory of the computer,
it is virtually impossible to use any computer program without making a 'copy'
of the entire program.").
1 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993)
("However, since we find that the copy created in the RAM can be 'perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated,' we hold that the loading of software
into the RAM creates a copy under the Copyright Act." (quoting 17 U.S.C.
§ 101)).
1617 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). (" 'Copyright owner,' with respect to any one of
the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that
particular right.") The exclusive right to create copies is reserved to the
copyright owner. Id. § 106(1).
1 MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518 (holding that copyrighted software loaded into
RAM without copyright ownership or permission from the copyright owner is
copyright infringement).
18 See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 95 (2001) (stating that
"us[ing] ... a computer to view, read, reread, hear, or otherwise experience a
work in digital form ... require[s] reproducing that work in a computer's
memory.").
19 See LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 14 (explaining that using software requires
temporary RAM copies).
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permission from the copyright owner for each use which results in
a RAM copy. 20 This requirement differentiates the use of software
from that of other creative works-where copying and use are not
so closely intertwined.2 1 In the context of MDY, each time a user
loads Blizzard's software into RAM, a copy is created-which
requires permission by license or statute to be lawful.22
C. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (1) Allows Owners to Make RAM Copies
Without Risking Infringement
According to the MDY court, 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) allows
owners of software copies to make RAM copies, if the use causing
the copy is "an essential step in using the computer program, "23
without risking infringement. 24  Because RAM copies must be
made before software is used,25 this statutory exception gives users
that own their copy of the software the right to actually use the
20 MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *10-11 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008), motion for
permanent injunction and alternative motion to amend the judgment denied, No.
CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78432, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept.
18, 2008) ("Thus, if a person is not authorized by the copyright holder (through
a license) or by law ... to copy the software to RAM, the person is guilty of
copyright infringement because the person has exercised a right (copying) that
belongs exclusively to the copyright holder."), available at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2006cv02555
/322017/82/0.pdf.
21 See LITMAN, supra note 18, at 16 (explaining that many common uses of
other copyrighted works, such as reading a chapter of a book in a bookstore, do
not require the author's permission). The inseparability of use and copying in
the software context conflicts with the basic premise of copyright law. See
Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 4 (1995) ("Copyright law was designed in order to protect physical
works of creative authorship which could be used without being copied.").
22 See MDY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at * 10-11 (explaining that making
a RAM copy "authorized by ... license ... or by law" is not infringement).
23 The MDY court focused its 17 U.S.C. § I1 7(a)(1) analysis on the question
of ownership, not whether their use of Glider was an "essential step" in playing
WoW. Id at *24 32.
24 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006).
25 See LEMLEY, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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copy without requiring additional licenses.2 6  Such federal
protection helps maintain a workable balance 27 between "copyright
holders' " rights and the right of users, who own their copy, to use
software.2 8
Because the statute only applies to owners, determining
whether a user is an owner or a licensee is critical. 29  This is
problematic in practice, as noted by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, because users often
license software "and the license[] ... [may] not . . . distinguish
between the copyright and the copy. "3o Ninth Circuit courts have
26 See MDY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at * 10-11 (explaining that making
a RAM copy "authorized ... by law" is not infringement).
27 Mark Lemley has commented on this balance:
Because of the nature of computer technology, and because vendors
can rely on several different intellectual property regimes concurrently,
the balance of intellectual property law is already tilted heavily in favor
of the intellectual property owner. The only countervailing forces
favoring users are those rights specifically granted to users by federal
law. In this context more than any other, therefore, it is justifiable to
fear that removing or eviscerating those user rights may bring the
whole edifice tumbling down.
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1239, 1282 (1995)
28 Corynne McSherry, Do You Own Your Software? WoW Glider Case Not
Just About Getting to Level 70, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/05/do-you-
own-your-software-wow-glider-case-not-just- ("This rule is a crucial part of the
balance Congress crafted between the rights of the copyright holder to manage
and benefit from its expressive work, and the rights of the public to innovate,
recreate and otherwise use and build on that work.") (last visited Oct. 24, 2008)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). In this Recent
Development, copyright holder generally refers to someone who possesses a
copyright. Id See also, LITMAN, infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text for
similar uses of the term.
29 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006) (applying statute to "owner[s] of a copy"). See
Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriffs Dep't , 447 F.3d 769, 784-85 (9th Cir.
2006) (explaining that users who license their copy of the software are not
entitled to an "essential step defense" under the Copyright Act).
'0 See Applied Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 153 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) ("The simple conclusion that Section 117 applies only to the owner of a
copy of a computer program, however, has proven difficult to apply because
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differed on the degree to which the license should be scrutinized
and which factors should be used to determine whether the license
conveys ownership of the software copy.3 1 MDY is important
because it adds the presence of "significant restrictions on ... use"
as a factor sufficient to classify the user "as a [mere] licensee" of
their software copy.32 Because use is such an expansive concept,
this holding threatens to render the statute useless.33
D. Users as Licensees of the Copy, Prior to MDY: MAI, Triad,
and Wall Data
1. MAI and Triad - Precedent, but No Principle for Determining
Ownership
The MDY court based its 17 U.S.C. § 117 analysis on three
Ninth Circuit cases: M4If Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,3 4
Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co.,35 and Wall
software companies frequently license their programs and the licenses do not
always distinguish between the copyright and the copy.").
"
1See Microsoft Corp. v. DAK Indus. Inc., 66 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995)
(stating that determining whether an agreement is a sale or a license requires
analyzing more than the terms of the transaction). But see MAI Sys. Corp. v.
Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that because
the software was licensed, the user was not an owner).
32 MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *25 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008), motion for
permanent injunction and alternative motion to amend the judgment denied, No.
CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78432, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept.
18, 2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/
arizona/azdce/2:2006cv02555/322017/82/0.pdf.
' See Corynne McSherry, You Bought It, But You Don't Own It, http://www.
eff.org/deeplinks/2008/07/you-bought-it-you-dont-own-it (arguing that the MDY
court did not adequately consider the likelihood that its decision would allow
copyright holders to bypass 17 U.S.C. § 117 altogether) (last visited Oct. 24,
2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); supra
note 18 and accompanying text (describing range of uses that result in RAM
copies).
' 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
" 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Data.36 In MAI, the court did not explore the possibility that a
software licensee could own their copy of the software and thus
claim an exception under 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1).3  Although
commentators have been critical of the MAI court's lack of
analysis regarding the applicability of 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) to
software licensees,3 8 the MDY court nonetheless cited M4I as
supporting its holding that Blizzard's licensees do not own their
copies.39 The Triad court merely confirmed the essence of 17
U.S.C. § 117-that the statute applies to "outright" owners of
software copies.4 0 These cases, on which MDY relied,4' do not
36 Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir.
2006); see MDY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988 at *25. The MDY court declined
to follow Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (W.D. Wash. 2008).
"The Court declines this invitation. Whatever freedom the court in Vernor may
have had to disregard Wall Data when applying a different statutory provision-
section 109-this Court does not have the same freedom. This case
concerns section 117, the very provision addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Wall
Data. The Court is not free to disregard Ninth Circuit precedent directly on
point." Id. at *30.3 7
' MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 n.5 (9th Cir.
1993). 17 U.S.C. § 117 was amended in 1998 to include a provision exempting
RAM copies made in conjunction with computer maintenance and repair from
copyright infringement. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 105 Pub. L. No.
304, § 302, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887 (1998).
38 M4I, 991 F.2d at 518 n.5 ("Since MAI licensed its software, the Peak
customers do not qualify as 'owners' of the software and are not eligible for
protection under § 117."). The MAI court's refusal to elaborate on their
reasoning has been criticized. See, e.g., MELVILLE B. & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08[B][1][c] (2008) ("The court's opinion does not
address the distinction between intangible and physical ownership, leaving
unanswered whether the relevant copies were owned, and hence whether the
Section 117 exemption should have applied. Accordingly, its logic is
inadequate.") (footnote omitted); Yeh, supra note 5, at 363 (acknowledging the
criticism of AM).
39 See MDY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *25-32.
40 Triad Systems Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d at 1333 (confirming that in
situations where software was sold, the purchaser was an owner under 17 U.S.C.
§ 117).
41 See MDY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *25 (identifying three Ninth
Circuit cases dealing with 17 U.S.C. § 117 and software licenses).
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clearly distinguish between licensing a copy and licensing the
copyrighted work.42
2. Wall Data Provides a Test to Determine Ownership
In contrast, Wall Data provides a more substantial analysis of
the extent to which a user's license conveys ownership to the copy
of the software, as opposed to the software itself (the copyrighted
work).43 The Wall Data court cited MAI as precedent for holding
that the defendants were licensees and not owners, but also noted
the criticism surrounding MAPs treatment of 17 U.S.C.
§ 117(a)(1). 4 4 More importantly, the Wall Data court took a step
beyond M4fI and articulated a two-part test that clarifies when a
purchaser is an owner and when a purchaser is a licensee of the
software copy: "Generally, if the copyright owner makes it clear
that she or he is granting only a license to the copy of software and
imposes significant restrictions on the purchaser's ability to
redistribute or transfer that copy, the purchaser is considered a
licensee, not an owner, of the software."4 5 The second prong of the
Wall Data test is critical. It requires "significant restrictions on the
purchaser's ability to redistribute or transfer that copy."46 The
mere existence of terms restricting other uses or the description of
the agreement as "a license to the copy of software" does not
satisfy the Wall Data test.4 7 The MDY court expanded the Wall
Data test by adding "significant restrictions on ... use" to the set
42 See David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87
CAL. L. REV. 17, 38 & n.82 (1999) (stating that Triad and MA do not clearly
distinguish between selling a copy subject to a license and licensing a copy).
43 Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 784-86 (9th
Cir. 2006) (providing analysis of a license to determine whether a user owned
their software copies).
44 It is important to also note the Wall Data court's qualified reliance on A:
"We recognize that our decision in AMI has been criticized .... We decline to
revisit our precedent in this case, because the Sheriffs Department's 'essential
step' defense fails for a more fundamental reason-that hard drive imaging was
not an essential step of installation-and thus any error is harmless." Id at 785
n.9 (citations omitted).
45 Id. at 785.46 Id
47 Id.
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of factors that should be considered when deciding ownership of a
copy of software.4 8
III. THE FACTS OF MDY V. BLIZZARD
Blizzard and Vivendi run the popular online game World of
Warcraft ("WoW").49 MDY created and sold a "bot""o program
called WowGlider ("Glider")." A "bot" is "a word derived from
'robot' " referring to programs that can emulate certain user
actions in the game.5 2 WoW players use bots while they are unable
to play the game themselves, for example, while sleeping or at
work.53 This allows players to advance more rapidly in the game
than they would have otherwise.54 WoW players use Glider in
conjunction with WoW-in violation of WoW's Terms of Use
("TOU")." Basing its holding on the Wall Data test, the MDY
court found that the users held licenses, limited by Blizzard's TOU
and End User License Agreement ("EULA"),"6 to their copies of
the software." Because Glider creates an "unauthorized"" copy of
Blizzard's software in RAM, Blizzard can hold users of Glider
48 MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *25 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008), motion for
permanent injunction and alternative motion to amend the judgment denied, No.
CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78432, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept.
18, 2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/
arizona/azdce/2:2006cv02555/322017/82/0.pdf.
49 See id at *2-3.




54 "Blizzard claims that Glider ... enable[s] some payers [sic] to advance
more quickly and unfairly, diminishing the game experience for other players."
Id at *4.
55Id at *18 19.
56 Id at *31-32. The holding that Blizzard granted a license that is limited in
scope is important because it is a prerequisite for a finding of copyright
infringement. Id. at * 12.
5 Id. at *24-32.
51 Id. at *18-19 (explaining that "the use of bots" violates Blizzard's TOU and
that the activity is "unauthorized").
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liable for copyright infringement." Furthermore, MDY, as
Glider's owner and distributor, faces liability for contributory
copyright infringement.60
IV. ANALYSIS: MDY EXPANDED THE WALL DATA TEST To
ENCOMPASS USER CHEATING WITH ROBOTS
A. The MDY Court Expanded the Scope of the Wall Data Test
Instead of merely following the Wall Data test, the MDY court
expanded it. The MDY court stated the second prong of the Wall
Data test as follows:
Wall Data provides a ... test for determining whether the purchaser of
a copy of a software program is a licensee or an owner: if the copyright
holder ... imposes significant restrictions on the use or transfer of the
copy, then the transaction is a license, not a sale, and the purchaser of
the copy is a licensee, not an "owner" within the meaning of section
117.61
Wall Data does not specify use as a factor of the test.62 The second
prong of the Wall Data test is limited to "redistribut[ion] or
transfer" of the software copy.63 By adding the term use,64 the
MDY court could then incorporate the provisions from Blizzard
"Id. at *31-32.
60 MDY Industries owns and distributes Glider. Id. at *3-4. MDY Industries
was found liable for contributory copyright infringement. Id. at *31-32.
61 Id. at *25 (second emphasis added).
62 See discussion of Wall Data test, supra Part II.D.2.
63 Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 785 (9th Cir.
2006); see also discussion of Wall Data test, supra Part II.D.2. Wall Data does
state that, "[t]he Sheriffs Department's use of and rights to the RUMBA
software products were restricted under the terms of the click-through and
volume booklet licenses." Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 785. However, because this
language is explanatory, "use" in this sentence likely refers to the redistribution
and transfer term stated previously in the test. Id. In addition, the excerpt of the
click-through license does not restrict "use" in the general sense; instead, it
specifically identifies uses related to distribution and transfer of the software.
Id. at 775 n.5. Finally, the volume license booklets specified the number of
licenses available to the Sheriffs Department, not the manner in which they
were to be used. Id. at 774.
64 See supra notes 62-63.
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TOU prohibiting the use of "bots."6 5 MDY represents a significant
expansion of the Wall Data test because any interaction between a
user and a software program is a use and the MDY court does not
clearly define which uses meet the threshold of their test.66 In
contrast, the narrower Wall Data test extends only to situations
where a software copy changes hands due to "redistribut[ion] or
transfer."67
B. MDY 's Expansion of the Wall Data Test Creates Incentives for
More Restrictive Licenses
MDY provides an incentive for copyright holders to incorporate
broad usage restrictions in their licenses.68 Copyright holders often
have an advantage in software licensing; as one empirical analysis
of software contracts revealed: "[iut is clear that EULAs are
almost always more pro-seller than the default rules of the UCC."69
65 MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *27 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008), motion for
permanent injunction and alternative motion to amend the judgment denied, No.
CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78432, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept.
18, 2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/
arizona/azdce/2:2006cv02555/322017/82/0.pdf ("As discussed above, the TOU
places additional restrictions on the use of the software."). Supra notes 52-53
and accompanying text (defining and discussing "bots").
66 The MDY court, in its 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) analysis, refers to Blizzard's
TOU as containing specific examples of uses which meet its test. MDY, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *27. However, it does not articulate a general
principle for analyzing license agreements to determine whether a use meets its
criteria in the context of 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1). Id. at *24-32. LEMLEY, supra
note 14 (explaining that using software requires temporary RAM copies).
67 Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 785.
61 Cf Amicus Curiae Brief of Public Knowledge In Support of Neither Party
On Cross-Motions For Summary Judgment at 24, MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard
Entm't, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *1
(D. Ariz. July 14, 2008) (Document 63-2), available at http://www.
publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-amicus-20080502.pdf (arguing that if software
manufacturers could use copyright law to impose blanket restrictions on use,
license terms fostering anticompetitive practices will emerge).
69 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What's in a Standard Form Contract? An
Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 677, 703 (2007).
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Considering the seller's favorable position, it seems likely that they
will craft licenses which take advantage of the vague language of
the MDY court's test.70 By adding license terms to sidestep 17
U.S.C. § 117(1), copyright holders can require licenses for uses
which might otherwise have been authorized by statute.1
Statutory damages for copyright infringement are significant.72
MDY provides copyright owners access to these statutory damages
by linking whether a user is an "owner of a copy" 73 to whether the
license term "imposes significant restrictions on . .. use." 74 The
prospect of statutory damages will push copyright owners to limit
use through licensing because each use authorized by license
becomes a potential source of revenue-enforceable by threat of
liability for copyright infringement.
See Amicus Curiae Brief of Public Knowledge, supra note 68.
71 McSherry, supra note 33. ("The logical implication of the holding is that
any time you buy software . . . software owners can always use license
agreements to prevent you from ever having full control over your software and
taking advantage of standard copyright limitations .... ).
72 Current copyright law provides statutory damages ranging from $750 to
$30,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006). The court may increase the damages
awarded to $150,000 in the case of willful infringement. Id. at § 504(c)(2).
Id. at § 117(a).
74 MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *25 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008), motion for
permanent injunction and alternative motion to amend the judgment denied, No.
CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78432, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept.
18, 2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/federal/courts/arizona/azdce/
322017/82/0.pdf.
7 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 83 (2001) "If the law requires
that we obtain a license whenever we wish to read protected text, it encourages
copyright owners to restrict the availability of licenses whenever it makes
economic sense for them to do so."). Although discussing the availability of
licenses in the context of access control technology, Litman's general point is
applicable. If there is an economic incentive, revenue from licensing uses for
example, copyright owners will seek to capture that revenue by requiring
additional licenses.
10 NC JOLT ONLINE ED. 1, 14 (2008)
MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment
C. MDY Erodes User Protections Granted by Congress
Copyright law seeks to balance copyright owners' right to
control their creative work and society's right to create new works
using the "ideas and information conveyed by . .. [the] work."76
Congress facilitates this balance by granting "limited . . . statutory
monopol[ies]" that stimulate the creation of new works while also
compensating authors." As the Supreme Court explained in
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly,
like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects
a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work
is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an "author's" creative labor.
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good.
17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) is an important limitation on the copyright
holder's right to control copying and, by implication, use in the
digital context. 79  The statute allows consumers to use software
without seeking the copyright holder's permission prior to the
creation of each temporary RAM copy." In her analysis of
76 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991)
("To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a
work."); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Symposium: Copyright Owners' Rights and
Users' Privileges on the Internet: Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-
Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511, 512 (1997) ("Copyright has always
represented a balance between owners' and users' rights.").
See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(explaining that the purpose of copyright law is to ensure that the public has
access to a wide array of creative works).
78 Id. (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 76 at 512 (analyzing
copyright law's purpose).
7 "[M]aking copies is an essential part of using computer programs. Because
of this important difference between computer software and other types of
copyrightable material, Congress followed the recommendations of CONTU and
passed section 117." MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW
99 (3rd ed. 2006).8 0 Id.
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proposed changes to copyright law during the 1990's, copyright
scholar Jessica Litman highlights the importance of statutory
authorization:
Most notably, since any use of a computer to view, read, reread, hear,
or otherwise experience a work in digital form would require
reproducing that work in a computer's memory, and since the copyright
statute gives the copyright holder exclusive control over reproductions,
everybody would need to have either statutory privilege or the
copyright holder's permission to view, read, reread, hear or otherwise
experience a digital work, each time she did so."
In this scenario, without "statutory privilege," every unlicensed use
is potentially infringing.82 MDY is a step in this direction", and it
risks fundamentally altering the balance between the rights of
"authors, publishers, users, and society."8 4
V. CONCLUSION
Blizzard's concern that the use of bots will undermine the
WoW gaming experience is legitimate, but regardless of copyright
law, contract law provides an adequate remedy for this violation of
WoW's Terms of Use."" With the exception of Wall Data, the
Ninth Circuit precedent relied upon in MDY provides very little
analysis of the applicability of 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1)."6 MDYs
8 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 95 (2001) (footnote omitted)
(analyzing proposed changes to copyright law during the 1990's).
82 id.
83 See McSherry, supra note 33 (arguing that MDY paves the way for
restrictive licenses that bypass 17 U.S.C. § 117).
84 "The result is that the public's 'reward' for copyright-access to the ideas
in the public domain-is protected only tenuously for computer software in
copyright law, by the right in section 117 of the Copyright Act to make certain
copies . . . ." Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses,
68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1280 (1995). See David Nimmer et al., The
Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REv. 17, 77 (1999)
(" 'Expand through contract' is a slogan that offends a constitutionally
defensible copyright regime. But when copyright's delicate equilibrium is
respected, authors, publishers, users, and society at large are all winners.").
See McSherry, supra note 28 (noting contract law as a remedy).
See discussion supra Part II.D.
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restatement of the Wall Data test is vague." This uncertainty
provides incentives for the creation of more restrictive licenses
which undermine the balance Congress struck between copyright
holders and users." Consequently, the Ninth Circuit should
abandon MDY in favor of a more literal application of the Wall
Data test.
87 See supra note 66.
88 See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
